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ABSTRACT This paper is a review of how and why the race concept has
changed in the United States during the 20th century. In the 19th century the
concept of race provided the unchallenged folk taxonomy and the prevailing
scientific paradigm for placing human biological and cultural variation into
categories called races. At the height of the eugenic and anti-immigration
movement of the early decades of the 20th century, Boas and his students be-
gan the critique of racism and aspects of the race concept. In the early 1950s
Washburn proposed that the modern synthesis replace race typology with the
study of processes and populations. In the 1960s new data on clinal genetic
gradations provided tools for studying human variation while challenging the
race concept. We present several kinds of documentation of the decline of the
race concept over the 20th century, and place the above changes in the context
of the essential development of new genetic evidence. We also relate the de-
cline of race to historical developments, the growth of the culture concept, and
the biographies of the participants. We reject political correctness and view
science as a self-correcting endeavor to relate concepts to the empirical world.
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Race decline: The evidence
Several lines of evidence indicate that
a majority of physical anthropologists in
the United States have rejected the con-
cept of biological races. Since 1968 my
several colleagues and I have been car-
rying out a series of empirical studies
demonstrating the decline of the race
concept [LIEBERMAN 1968; LIEBERMAN
and REYNOLDS 1978; LITTLEFIELD et al.
1982; LIEBERMAN et al. 1989, 2003].
A documented source of evidence of the
decline of support for the race concept is
seen in a content analysis of the fre-
quency of articles in the American
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Journal of Physical Anthropology
(AJPA) using either the race concept or
the traditional taxonomy of Caucasoid,
Mongoloid, Negroid from 1918–2001
(in odd-numbered years). In 1918 the
AJPA began publishing and 60 percent
of articles on human variation used the
race concept or race taxonomies. In odd-
numbered subsequent years (see Fig. 1),
among 1,636 articles, the percentage
varied but gradually declined to 4 per-
cent in 2001 (r = -.89, p = .01). Viewed
in three periods (see Table 1) the per-
centages using race were: 61 percent in
1918–1943; 42 percent in 1945–1973;
and 21 percent in 1975–2001 (chi-
square = 179.48, df = 4, p < .01).
This change is reflected in introduc-
tory textbooks of physical anthropology
published from 1932 to 2003. Up to
1969 only one author of three of 20 texts
rejected race [MONTAGU 1945, 1951,
1960]. A turning point came in the
1970s when ten texts rejected race while
five continued to accept the concept
[LITTLEFIELD et al. 1982]. In the 1980s
the trend increased, and in the 1990s
nine texts rejected race [LIEBERMAN et
al. 2003] and only one accepted the
concept [CAMPBELL 1998]. The pattern
of 1932–1969 had been completely re-
versed.
A third source of information also in-
dicated changes in the status of the race
concept. A series of three questionnaires
was mailed to members of the American
Anthropological Association. Over the
course of 21 years the survey responses
indicated increasing rejection of the race
concept. In the 1978 series [LIEBERMAN
and REYNOLDS 1978] the questionnaire
was mailed to college and university
researchers and teachers of physical
anthropology. One of the questions
asked them to agree or disagree with this
statement: “Races do not exist because
isolation of groups has been infrequent,
populations have always interbred.”
Thirty-seven percent of 374 respondents
agreed (48 percent response rate). In a
second study in the series 42 percent























































Fig. 1.  Race articles as percent of human variation articles. AJPA, 1918–2001. Mostly odd numbered
years (r = .89, p = .01)
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thropologists rejected the race concept
by disagreeing with this statement:
“There are biological races in the spe-
cies Homo sapiens” (71 percent re-
sponse rate; LIEBERMAN et al. [1989]).
The third study occurred in 1999 and
presented the same statement, and 69
percent of responding physical anthro-
pologists rejected the concept (46 per-
cent response rate; LIEBERMAN et al.
[2003]).
As noted, the period of change meas-
ured in different types of studies seemed
to occur at different times and rates.
There was a gradual decline after 1935
in the AJPA (Fig. 1). The textbook de-
cline begins in the 1970s, and the sur-
veys indicated a change in the 1980s. In
part, this is because somewhat different
populations are involved. Those who
published in the AJPA were engaged in
research and were more often members
of the American Association of Physical
Anthropology (AAPA). Those respon-
ding to surveys were listed in the Ameri-
can Anthropological Association Guide
to Departments and Members (1973,
1985, 1999), less likely to be members
of the AAPA and possibly more likely
to be teachers of the subject than re-
searchers. Authors of texts included
both sources. It is noteworthy that the
first population to evidence decline of
race were the researchers. The timing of
the changes varied, but over the course
of the 20th century, acceptance of the
race concept inherited from the 18th and
19th century had undergone significant
decline.
Explaining the decline
in an accepted truth
Concepts embedded in scientific dis-
ciplines and in public opinion do not just
fade away, they must be critiqued,
challenged with data, and replaced by
more useful concepts. It would require
about half of the 20th century for the
essential development of concepts and
data relating to heredity and genetics to
enable rejection of the thinking of the
19th century. G.W. STOCKING [1968:
163] states that “physical anthropology
around 1900 had wandered far into a
blind alley from which it was not really
to emerge for another fifty years.”
Table 1. Race articles in the American Journal of Physical Anthropology in three periods,
 as a percent of articles on human variation
                                       Period
1918–1943 1945–1973 1975–2001 TotalRace
%        (N) %        (N) %        (N) (N)
Used 61 (172) 42 (189) 21 (193) (554)
Undecided 5  (15) 6  (25) 5  (44) (84)
Not used 33  (93) 52 (236) 74 (669) (998)
Total human
variation articles 99* (280) 100 (450) 100 (906) (1,636)
Chi-square = 179.48, df  = 4, p <.01
*Some totals vary from 100 due to rounding
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STOCKING [1968] summarized the 19th
century idea of race as it was used in
1900:
Physical anthropologists had started from
a preevolutionary polygenist conception
of “pure race” as an assemblage of traits
manifest in every individual race member,
essentially unchanged by time or circum-
stance. They had carried on their investi-
gations in a period when there was much
speculation about heredity but no gener-
ally accepted theory of its processes
(p. 163).
At the start of the 20th century belief
in race and racism were established
truths in American folk beliefs and in
the beliefs and publications of scientists.
In 1918, in the preface to the first issue
of the American Journal of Physical
Anthropology, the editor and founder,
Aleš HRDLIČKA [1918] described an
important objective of physical anthro-
pology as “the study of the more primi-
tive human races” (p. 19). He added the
“effects of racial mixtures” (p. 20), and
“the growing science of eugenics”
(p. 21). In 1915, he stated that those who
cannot keep pace are being eliminated
by nature (quoted by RANKIN-HILL and
BLAKEY [1999: 115]) and, in 1927, he
concluded that “the real problem of the
American Negro lies in his brain”
(1927: 208-9, quoted by RANKIN-HILL
and BLAKEY [1999: 115]). In the early
decades of the 20th century, Hrdlička
was expressing the widespread views of
society and the scientific community.
In the early decades of the 20th cen-
tury the idea of eugenics appealed to the
public and to early geneticists. The in-
fluential ideas of the time included race,
racism, race purity, social Darwinism
and a very simple view of dominant and
recessive genes that could be used to
bring about race improvement. Slowly,
beginning early in the 20th century,
research would challenge and qualify or
disprove the elements of the race con-
cept, but the influence of new genetic
knowledge would not begin until a new
paradigm, the modern synthesis, was
established, starting in the 1930s, with
change possibly reflected in the decline
of race articles in the AJPA beginning in
1935 (see Figure 1).
Influence of the modern
synthesis and genetics
The period of the modern synthesis is
one of rapid change in evolutionary
biology from approximately 1936 to
1947 [MAYR 1980]. HUXLEY [1942]
identified the evolutionary synthesis in
terms of an interaction of “small genetic
changes . . .  and recombination and the
ordering of this genetic variation by
natural selection” [MAYR 1980: 1]. The
synthesis had two effects. First, it
brought to an end the conflict between
those who believed evolution was the
result of mutations and those who util-
ized natural selection as the prime
mover. Second, and crucial in relation to
this paper, it opened the door to an ex-
pansion of genetic analyses of popula-
tions that would in time bring an end to
the viewing of races as homogeneous
typologies. It did not lead directly to a
rejection of the race concept, but made
possible a rejection of parts of that con-
cept that in time would contribute to the
decline of race.
The thinking of T. DOBZHANSKY
[1937], one of the leaders and supporters
of the synthesis, illustrates the influence
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of genetics on the race concept without
yet rejecting it:
In classical morphology and anthropology,
races are described usually in terms of the
statistical averages for all the characters in
which they differ from each other. . .  The
difficulty is however that from the point of
view of genetics such an attempt to deter-
mine to which race a given individual be-
longs is sometimes an unmitigated fallacy.
The fact which is very often overlooked in
making such attempts is that racial differ-
ences are more commonly due to varia-
tions in the relative frequencies of genes
in different parts of the species population
than to an absolute lack of certain genes in
some groups and their complete homozy-
gosis in others (p. 61).
DOBZHANSKY [1937] states that the
“fundamental units of racial variability
are populations and genes, not the com-
plexes of characters which connote in
the popular mind a racial distinction”
(p. 62). In this way Dobzhansky led the
way from typologies of racial similarity
to genetic thinking. MONTAGU [1942]
made early use of genetics and the mod-
ern synthesis in his proposal to replace
the race concept with that of ethnicity
which referred to an ethnic group as
a population whose genetic makeup
changed in relation to geographic and
cultural barriers. He also made use of
the principles of gene flow and inde-
pendent assortment in meiosis to dis-
prove the myth of racial homogeneity
and purity [MONTAGU 1941].
The wide-spread belief that races
were separate homogeneous populations
was analyzed in the study by geneticist
LEWONTIN [1972] of 17 hereditary
traits in which he found that only 6.3
percent of genetic diversity is accounted
for by differences between races (see
also RELETHFORD [2002], BROWN and
ARMELAGOS [2001]). This research was
summarized in the phrase that there is
more variation within populations than
among them. It became a widely-used
genetic fact to refute the notion that
races were discrete and different from
each other and that their members had
very similar traits.
The belief in the lesser intelligence of
African-Americans and European supe-
riority, was a companion to the idea of
race in the 19th and much of the 20th
century [HERRNSTEIN and MURRAY
1994]. Did European ancestry mean
greater intelligence? Intelligence tests
were given to 350 African American
school children in Philadelphia [SCARR
et al. 1977]. Each person’s degree of
African and European ancestry was
estimated from blood samples indicating
12 hereditary traits that were more likely
to have either African or European an-
cestry, corroborated by degree of skin
color. The researchers found that
“Blacks who had a large number of
European ancestors did no better or
worse than blacks of almost total Afri-
can ancestry” [SCARR and WEINBERG
1978: 32].
The complete rejection of the exis-
tence of race was extended back hun-
dreds of thousands of years by geneticist
TEMPLETON [1998]:
Because of the extensive evidence for
genetic interchange through population
movements and recurrent gene flow going
back at least hundreds of thousands of
years ago, there is only one evolutionary
lineage of humanity and there are no sub-
species or races under either the tradi-
tional or phylogenetic definitions. Human
evolution and population structure have
been and are characterized by many
locally differentiated populations coexist-
ing at any given time, but with sufficient
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genetic contact to make all of humanity a
single lineage sharing a common long-
term evolutionary fate (p. 647, emphasis
added).
TEMPLETON [2002] also summarized the
arbitrariness and lack of empirical con-
sistency in race categories:
. . . if the frequency of blood types is used
as a marker, the Irish and Nigerians would
be placed in the same biological race (see
Boyd 1950). Because Melanesians and
some Africans “share dark skin, hair tex-
ture, and cranial-facial morphology, they
have sometimes been placed in the same
race, but genetically Europeans are closer
to Africans and Melanesians than Africans
and Melanesians are to each other (p. 46).
Late in the 20th century when studies
of apes had accumulated it was possible
to compare the amount of genetic varia-
tion with variation among chimpanzees,
which were 98 percent similar to hu-
mans. The comparisons to the “great
apes indicated that humans are unique in
having little genetic variation as well as
little genetic structure in their gene
pool” [KAESSMAN and PÄÄBO 2002: 1].
Further evidence of the influence of
the 20th century concepts and data is
present in 1996 in the American Asso-
ciation of Physical Anthropologists’
statement rejecting the 19th century idea
of race. The statement, presented as a
revision of the 1964 UNESCO statement
on race (see MONTAGU [1972]) asserted
that (AAPA Statement on biological
aspects of race [1996: 569-70], empha-
sis added):
As scientists who study human evolution
and variation, we believe that we have an
obligation to share with other scientists
and the general public our current under-
standing of the structure of human varia-
tion from a biological perspective. Popu-
lation conceptualization of race was de-
rived from 19th and early 20th century
scientific formulations. These old racial
categories were based on externally visi-
ble traits, primarily skin color, features of
the face, and the shape and size of the
head and body, and the underlying skele-
ton. They were often imbued with non-
biological attributes, based on social con-
structions of race.
The AAPA Statement [1996] goes on
to emphasize biological variation:
. . .much of the biological variation among
populations involves modest degrees of
variation in the frequency of shared
traits. . .
. . .There is great genetic diversity within
all human populations. Pure races, in the
sense of genetically homogeneous popu-
lations, do not exist in the human species
today, nor is there any evidence that they
have ever existed in the past. . .
. . .The geographic pattern of genetic
variation within this array is complex, and
presents no major discontinuity. Humans
cannot be classified into discrete geo-
graphic categories with absolute bounda-
ries. . .
. . .The human features which have univer-
sal biological value for the survival of the
species are not known to occur more fre-
quently in one population than in any
other. Therefore it is meaningless from the
biological point of view to attribute a gen-
eral inferiority or superiority to this or to
that race.
. . .For many millennia, human progress in
any field has been based on culture and
not on genetic improvement. . .
Partly as a result of gene flow, the heredi-
tary characteristics of human populations
are in a state of perpetual flux. Distinctive
local populations are continually coming
into and passing out of existence.
The biological consequence of mating
depend only on the individual genetic
makeup of the couple, and not on their ra-
cial classifications. Therefore, no biologi-
cal justification exists for restricting in-
termarriage between persons of different
racial classifications.
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There is no necessary concordance be-
tween biological characteristics and cul-
turally defined groups. On every conti-
nent, there are diverse populations that
differ in language, economy, and culture.
There is no national, religious, linguistic
or cultural group or economic class that
constitutes a race. However, human beings
who speak the same language and share
the same culture frequently select each
other as mates, with the result that there is
often some degree of correspondence be-
tween the distribution of physical traits on
the one hand and that of linguistic and
cultural traits on the other.
. . .genetic capacity is known to differ
among individuals. The peoples of the
world today appear to possess equal bio-
logical potential for assimilating any hu-
man culture. Racist political doctrines find
no foundation in scientific knowledge
concerning modern or past human popu-
lations (pp. 569-70, emphasis added).
The influence of clines
Strong genetic influence weakening
the race concept is also seen growing
out of the concept of clines and sup-
porting data. Clines referred to grada-
tions of genotypes or phenotypes over a
geographic area, and were distributed
within and across racial and national
boundaries. In 1938 HUXLEY proposed
the concept of clines, but clarified that it
was not a taxonomic entity, otherwise it
might be confused with race. At about
the same time HUXLEY and HADDON’S
[1936] book, We Europeans, presented
one of the early maps of a cline showing
gradations in the B blood type starting at
a low frequency in Spain and increasing
towards Moscow. They advocated re-
placing the concept of race with that of
ethnic groups, yet they also presented
phenotypic description of the traditional
human races, illustrating the difficulty
of abandoning racial labels and their
morphology.
The presence of gradations and their
discordance had been noted even earlier
in research by Boas. In Sweden “the
most striking point is the lack of agree-
ment between [hair color and stature]
among themselves [and] with the vari-
ability of the cephalic index” [BOAS
1918: 425]. The concept of cline began
to enter anthropological awareness in
the 1950s when LIVINGSTONE [1958]
published data indicating that the clinal
distribution of the sickle-cell allele (Hbs)
corresponded to the distribution of ma-
laria throughout West Africa, the Medi-
terranean, and South Asia, demonstrat-
ing that Hbs is not confined to one so-
called race and that alleged boundary
lines between so-called races are really
continuous gradations, not merely tran-
sitions between one race and another.
In the early 1960s LIVINGSTONE [1962]
participated in the debate over the va-
lidity of race and declared that “there are
no races, there are only clines” (p. 279).
C.L. BRACE [1964] made use of the
clinal concept urging the study of one
trait at a time in order to identify the
explanation for its geographic distribu-
tion. He also published several clinal
maps of skin pigmentation, nasal index,
hemoglobin S, and tooth size, showing
their discordant distribution did not sup-
port the idea of racial boundary lines.
Over several decades J. BIRDSELL
[1993] used the cline concept for ana-
lyzing data on Australian aborigines
which also illustrated discordant distri-
bution. In 1975 he rejected his earlier
use of the race concept [BIRDSELL
1972], and announced that “The use of
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the term race has been discontinued
the term race has been discontinued
because it is scientifically undefinable
and carries social implications that are
harmful and disruptive” [BIRDSELL
1975: 505].
The foregoing genetic and natural sci-
ence research studies were developed
increasingly during the 20th century and
continued into the 21st. They made it
progressively more unproductive to use
the race concept for research. As the
century moved on, and as the above data
and concepts were presented, more and
more anthropologists were using them to
develop their critique of the idea of race.
Lieberman and Kirk’s survey of 1999
asked respondents about their support or
rejection of biological race and found
that among those who rejected the race
concept 79 percent supported analyzing
variation in terms of clines rather than
races, 78 percent rejected the idea of
homogeneous populations, 80 percent
supported more variation within so-
called races than among them and, for
88 percent, gene flow invalidated label-
ing distinct races (Table 2).
Development of the culture
concept: Boas and Columbia
Early in the 20th century belief in the
fixed and unchanging nature of race
traits was another idea accepted by
many anthropologists. Possibly the first
to challenge it with empirical data was
F. Boas. His 1912 research using metric
evidence demonstrated small but sig-
nificant changes in stature and head
shape of second-generation children of
immigrants, thus disproving the idea
that race characteristics do not change,
and demonstrating that race biology was
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influenced by environment. Although
the changes were relatively small, it was
an idea that ran contrary to the idea of
fixity of race and racial determination
that prevailed at that time [GRAYLEE et
al. 2003]. Boas had begun the critique of
the race concept that gave both heredity
and environment a role to play. The
critique of race would be led by his stu-
dents at Columbia University for almost
half a century as they developed the
culture concept.
The quotations cited earlier from the
AAPA statement on race are based on
the genetic research of the 20th century
and on the development of the concept
of culture, as seen in the several refer-
ences to culture: that human progress is
based on culture and is not derived from
genetic improvement; that there is no
necessary concordance between biologi-
cal characteristics and culturally defined
groups, and any individual or group may
learn any culture. This idea of each so-
ciety having a culture grew out of the
research of Boas. From 1897 to 1902,
through his leadership of the Jessup
North Pacific Expedition, he gathered
the data to disprove the biological de-
terminism that linked race, language,
and culture. He did this by showing that
regional cultures exchange myths, cus-
toms, and language. Through his cri-
tique of unilineal evolution he demon-
strated that the hierarchy of racial supe-
riority was fallacious. Boas confronted
race and racism using ethnographic ex-
planations of cultural differences [BOAS
1911, 1927]. The idea of culture pro-
vided an alternative to biological race as
a way of analyzing differences between
societies. Cultures, as different ways of
living, could only be explained by
looking at the ecological setting of a
population, its contact with other cul-
tures, the exchanging of myths, customs
and language, all of which were parts of
that society’s complex history. The
comparative empirical evidence was
readily available. The Dutch in South
Africa built racial apartheid, unlike their
cousins in the Netherlands who devel-
oped a pluralistic society in which Afri-
cans occupied a wide range of occupa-
tions despite being perceived as inferior
[BLAKELY 1993]. Each of the empires
of the 16th to the 20th centuries devel-
oped diverse colonial cultures in relation
to differing circumstances, but none
were free of racism.
Also illustrative is the notion that any
individual could learn any culture, yet
can help bring about change in the cul-
ture they are learning. During the 20th
century, students of Boas included more
women, immigrants, African Ameri-
cans, Puerto Ricans, and Jews. They had
experienced discrimination based on
their alleged biological inferiority. In the
context of discrimination and historical
change they would take the new data
seriously and examine its empirical va-
lidity. These new recruits into anthro-
pology would become part of the leader-
ship that would reject race and racism.
We have reviewed the scientific influ-
ences on race from Boas at Columbia
University and, from the accumulation of
genetic knowledge during the 20th cen-
tury, from the new concept of culture and
the entry of persons from different back-
grounds into the anthropological disci-
pline. Another major source of new
knowledge and new influence came from
the students of Hooton at Harvard and,
as we will see, especially S. Washburn.
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A new physical anthropology:
Hooton and Washburn
While Boas was studying changes in
head form and had begun training doc-
toral students in cultural anthropology at
Columbia University, Hooton, starting
in 1913, was training physical anthro-
pologists at Harvard. Hooton’s research
was dedicated to reconstructing racial
histories from skeletal populations. In
The Indians of Pecos Pueblo, he classi-
fied several prehistoric skulls to which
he assigned racial labels. For Hooton
there were 29 races and subraces
[STASKI and MARKS 1992]. He was also
committed to explaining behaviors as an
expression of biology.
From 1926 to 1951 Hooton had 28
doctoral students who completed dis-
sertations. There were 10 dissertations
that included race in their title. A few of
these authors would be lifelong defend-
ers of the concept, i.e., C. Coon 1928,
A. Brues 1940, and S. Garn 1948 (dates
listed here and below are for disserta-
tions listed in GILES [1997: 500]). In
various ways many of Hooton’s doctoral
students used the concept of race but
qualified the 19th century ideas about it.
J.L. Angel (1942) studied ancient Greek
skeletal material and demonstrated that
the idea of racial purity was disproved
by the diverse ancestry reflected in those
bones. J. Birdsell (1942) demonstrated
three ancestral sources of Australian
Aborigines, developed extensive clinal
data on them and, as stated earlier,
would later completely reject the race
concept. W. Howells (1934) would util-
ize the race concept, but gathered
worldwide cranial measurements that
illustrate both diversity and “descrip-
tive typology” [ARMELAGOS and VAN
GERVEN 2003], and eventually came to
prefer the term population [OUSLEY and
JANTZ 1996]. F. Hulse (1934) would
later write on races as changing episodes
over time. G. Lasker (1945) was a criti-
cal skeptic about race. In one way or
another most of these students of
Hooton qualified the race concept mak-
ing it easier for others to reject it.
A link between the influences of
Columbia and Harvard can be seen in
H. Shapiro’s 1926 study of the descen-
dants of Tahitian and English mutineers
on the Bounty disproving the idea that
racial admixture was harmful. Shapiro
produced the first Ph.D. thesis under
Hooton, and was much influenced by
the Boasian orientation. He also was an
adjunct faculty member at Columbia for
many years.
The most influential of Hooton’s
doctoral students would be S. Wash-
burn. His dissertation “A Preliminary
Study of the Skeletons of Langurs and
Macaques” (1940, in GILES [1997]), in
part, reflected Hooton’s interests.
Among the dissertations by Washburn’s
students (listed in SPENCER [1997])
were R. Holloway 1964; R. Tuttle 1965;
A. Almquist 1972; F.C. Howell 1953;
and A. Mann 1968. Eleven of his doc-
toral students worked on primate and
animal behavior. Among them were
I. DeVore 1962; P.J. Dolhinow 1963;
P. Simonds 1963; J.B. Lancaster 1996;
A. Zihlman 1966; S. Chevalier-Skolni-
koff 1970; K.R. Gibson; and R.B. Lee.
Of all of these, it should be made clear
that most did not finally reject race, and
did not do research using it or write in
defense of it. Two of Washburn’s doc-
toral students who completed disserta-
tions on molecular anthropology were
V. Sarich (1967) and M. Weiss (1969).
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Sarich would be a lifelong defender of
race, but M. Weiss would join with A.
Mann to reject it in their introductory
physical anthropology textbooks [WEISS
and MANN 1975, 1978].
Washburn’s indirect impact on race
is seen in that the research of most of
his students at Harvard, Chicago, and
Berkely concerns primate biology
and/or primate behavior, part of the
trend away from the study of races
made possible by new specializations.
His direct influence on the race concept
started in the late 1940s and the 1950s.
WASHBURN [1953] encouraged physical
anthropologists to “replace typological
constructs with the core ideas of the
new synthesis of evolutionary theory –
the genetic diversity of populations and
the modification of gene frequencies
through selection, mutation, and drift”
[PATTERSON 2001: 121]. In 1953
WASHBURN declared that “the goal of
physical anthropology should not be the
classification of human diversity but
rather explanation of the processes
and mechanisms that gave rise to it”
[PATTERSON 2001: 123, WASHBURN
1963].
WASHBURN [1951, 1953] emphasized
process. “Natural selection, he insisted,
operates on functional complexes, not
on isolated traits” [ZIHLMAN 2001:
182]. Washburn’s view stemmed from
his efforts to analyze processes of
skeletal evolution and function. His
work was related to the major shift in
biology occurring during the 20th cen-
tury based on thinking increasingly in
context of the neo-Darwinian synthesis.
Washburn co-sponsored with Dobzhan-
sky the 1950 symposium on the “Origin
and Evolution of Man” held at Cold
Spring Harbor attended by 129 persons,
helping to diffuse the modern synthesis
of genetics and Darwinian theory to
prominent anthropologists and geneti-
cists.
Washburn’s activities extending be-
yond the classroom and beyond his
work with his students included the
Summer Seminars in Anthropology
from 1945 to 1952, and organizing two
major Wenner-Gren Conferences – “The
Social Life of Early Man” in 1959 and
“Classification and Human Evolution”
in 1962. He was active and influential in
the Wenner-Gren Foundation which was
a major source of funding and institu-
tionalization of the “new physical an-
thropology” in part, by sponsoring 47
research projects and conferences from
1951 to 1961 [HARAWAY 1988].
PATTERSON [2001] summarized sev-
eral forces at work in the race contro-
versy in the 1960s, including the think-
ing of Washburn:
In 1962, Washburn (1963: 521) was asked
by the Executive Board of the American
Anthropological Association to address
the subject of race in his presidential ad-
dress to that body. The issues of race and
racism were once again making front-page
headlines in the United States because of
the school integration mandated by the
American Supreme Court’s 1954 decision
in Brown v. Board of Education. Race and
racism were also debated in virtually
every number of Current Anthropology
published between October 1961 and Oc-
tober 1963. These issues were provoked
initially by Juan Comas’s (1961) critique
of articles in the first issue of The Man-
kind Quarterly which had recycled old
eugenic arguments that purported to sup-
port claims regarding the mental inferior-
ity of non-Whites. The publication of
Carleton Coon’s (1904-81) The Origin
of Races in 1962 added fuel to the fire
(p. 122).
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WASHBURN [1963] explained his
view, putting race into a minor key,
unlike the emphasis on race as a core
concept that had prevailed in the first
decades of the 20th century.
Since races are open systems which are
intergrading, the number of races will de-
pend on the purpose of the classification.
This is, I think, a tremendously important
point. It is significant that as I was re-
viewing classifications in preparing this
lecture, I found that almost none of them
mentioned any purpose for which people
were being classified. Race isn’t very im-
portant biologically (p. 524).
Washburn was not directly rejecting
race, but reducing its biological impor-
tance, possibly a strategic approach to
what in the 1960s was a widely accepted
concept.
The diverse interests of Washburn’s
students illustrates the change occurring
as physical anthropology came to re-
name itself biological anthropology.
S. GARN [1982] commented on this
diversification as an explanation for the
decreasing frequency of the study of
races as reflected in textbooks of intro-
ductory anthropology in the 1970s.
. . .physical anthropologists have found
many new directions of interest, such as
bone biology, primate behavior, dental
anthropology, demography, epidemiology,
and human nutrition. These newer inter-
ests are reflected in contemporary texts
and especially in the several journals that
physical anthropologists support (p. 649).
We believe this broadening of re-
search areas to be a significant factor.
Physical anthropologists research and
publish less on race because they attend
to other areas of inquiry where the con-
cept is of little or no use. Illustrative of
this is that at its annual meetings, the
AJPA “collaborates with seven other
organizations” including the Human
Biology Association, Paleopathology
Association, Dental Anthropology As-
sociation, American Association of
Dermatoglyphics, and the Primate
Biological Behavior Interest Group
[LARSON 2000]. Paleoanthropology and
genetic or molecular anthropology must
be added to Garn’s list of new speciali-
zations.
The rejection of the 19th century race
concept became evident late in the 20th
century, but it had begun much earlier
and taken most of the century for the
research that would make the concept
untenable to develop. Boas had began
that research late in the 19th century,
many subsequent studies (examples
listed above) built up momentum, and
WASHBURN [1963] supported the neo-
synthetic framework that consolidated
these developments and allied the new
physical anthropology with the Boasian
contributions. G. STOCKING [1968]
noted this connection:
. . .when a “new” physical anthropology
emerged around 1950, it bore marked, if
only analogical, similarity to Boas’
thinking . . .  the main similarity is a com-
mon evolutionary dynamic. . . .He had a
definite idea of what a rigorous evolu-
tionism required in terms of process on the
population level. . . .Viewed as a whole,
his critique of racial formalism in physical
anthropology undercut many of the tradi-
tional hierarchical assumptions of racial
thinking in its broader and more popular
forms (pp. 188-9).
A similar view is expressed more re-
cently by R. CASPARI [2003]:
To some extent, the new physical anthro-
pology espoused by Washburn repre-
sented a re-alliance with the Boasian parts
of anthropology that had questioned the
assumptions of the race concept since the
1890s. (p. 68).
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What is left of biological race?
According to CASPARI [2003], Amer-
ican physical anthropologists have
heeded Washburn’s call for a new
physical anthropology in that they have
moved from making types (races) their
subject matter to populations as the ob-
ject of study. Caspari also notes that two
of the three most salient attributes or
dimensions of the race concept have
“been less amenable to change” (p. 66).
The dimension that has changed the
most is biological determinism (i.e.,
racism) of which CASPARI [2003] writes
that: “Biological determinism is not a
necessary part of racial typologies and
can be rejected without the rejection of
the race concept as a whole” (p. 67).
According to CASPARI [2003], the two
dimensions of race that have changed
least are essentialism and evolutionary
essentialism (clades). Essentialism re-
fers to the “intrinsic biology of the race”
(p. 66). Evolutionary essentialism is
based on subspecific taxonomic catego-
ries that are conceptualized as discrete
groups whose essences (racial traits) had
separate evolutionary histories, and
“races like species categories, were de-
picted as branches on an evolutionary
tree. . .  [with] independent evolution, at
different rates.” CASPARI [2003] ex-
plains that “clades, defined as mono-
phyletic groups. . .  include an ancestral
taxon and all its descendants; clearly,
races are not monophyletic and their
depiction as clades is inappropriate”
(p. 67, emphasis in original). We agree
that many research papers inappropri-
ately present essentialism of human
races and cladistic diagrams based on
genetic or morphometric distances like
species on a tree.
We also agree that there has been a
shift from race to populations as de-
scribed by Caspari. We add one qualifi-
cation to that based on examining all
issues of the AJPA for the year 2001. In
those issues we found only two articles
using the race concept, and eleven using
the term population. However, we found
17 papers referring to the people studied
by some form of group name: Tibetan,
Samoan, British, Maya, Cape colored,
etc. The name may be a nation, geo-
graphic location, an ethnic label, or pos-
sibly “race”, or population.
We had expected to find more explicit
use of concepts of ethnicity and cline in
the AJPA, but in the 2001 issue we
found little of either, and one reference
to ethnicity stated that the two ethnic
groups studied have remained distinct
breeding populations [MADRIGAL et al.
2001]. As in the history of the AJPA
from 1918 onward, the subject matter,
be it race, population, or some other
entity, is not adequately defined. In gen-
eral, we agree that we are in a state of
transition from race to population, with




Are some scientific concepts influ-
enced by history? Does the inevitable
historical association of race and racism
allow scientists to study race but ignore
that connection? The 1996 AAPA
statement quoted above, examines both
race and racism. The developing genetic
knowledge of the 20th century did not
give scientific basis to racism and its
eugenic companion, but neither did it
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suddenly bring down the hierarchy of
racism that ruled the thinking of the
public and most scientists in the first
decades of the 20th century:
. . . in the 1930s a number of geneticists
began to realize that heredity was more
complex than had been previously
thought. As Provine has shown, however,
there was no new scientific evidence in-
troduced in the crucial period between
1939 and 1949, the period of decisive shift
in attitudes toward race in most western
countries. As Provine points out, it was
the war – and (especially) postwar revela-
tions of Nazi genocide – that brought
about the end (insofar as it ended) of the
racialist consensus (PROCTOR [1988: 175],
citing Provine 1973).
In 1945 the Second World War ended
and according to the historian, G.M.
FREDRICKSON [2002]:
The Second World War. . .  was the climax
and turning point in the history of racism
in the twentieth century. It, and the Cold
War that followed quickly on its heels,
revolutionized the context within which
groups thought of as “races” confronted
each other and interacted. Events in the
1940s and 1950s would establish patterns
of thought and action concerning race and
racism that would endure for the rest of
the century. The specific results of the war
that most shaped attitudes toward race
were the Holocaust and the beginning of
decolonialization in Asia and Africa. The
first aroused widespread soul-searching
and moral revulsion by revealing what
happened when extreme racism was car-
ried to its logical outcome. The second
eventually gave geopolitical significance
to many new independent nations that
were composed of people whose skin
color made them abhor and denounce the
persistence of white supremacy (p. 127).
FREDRICKSON [2002] adds that “the
horrible truth revealed by the liberation
of the death camps in 1945 could not
be evaded” (p. 128). For example, the
eugenics movement that had benefited
from scientific respectability in the
United States and Britain in the first
decades of the 20th century “did not
survive the revelation of what the Nazis
had done in its name” (p. 128).
As stated, according to several sources
the developing genetic knowledge did
not diminish the race concept, but at
first stimulated “the quest for new and
more scientific racial traits. . . .The im-
pact of genetics had to wait until the
development of a synthetic theory of
evolution in the 1930s” (ARMELAGOS
and VAN GERVEN [2003: 55], emphasis
in original). That full impact of the
synthetic theory did not occur until the
1950s, and followed the revelations of
the Nazi atrocities of World War II. We
argue that the increasingly significant
impact of genetics occurred following
these events. Some aspects of genetics
had been available in the early 1940s in
the writing of A. MONTAGU [1941,
1942], but their significance was not
widely recognized until the more com-
plete awareness of genocide later in the
1940s.
It would be naive to reject the influ-
ence of history and equally naive to
accept its influence without considering
the accumulating genetic knowledge.
Many of the supporters of eugenics in
the 1920s and 1930s were from the po-
litical left, they would become oppo-
nents of racism in the 1940s, and they
would have the support of the accumu-
lating scientific research, and would
thus have been sensitized to its signifi-
cance by historical events.
Occasionally a student will suggest
that the race concept has been rejected
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because of political correctness arising
from the horrified reaction to the holo-
caust in World War II Nazi Germany.
We must acknowledge that political
correctness is a generic aspect of human
behavior. Without conformity to group
expectations human societies would be
anarchies devoid of cultural patterns. An
example of the negative consequences
of political correctness is seen in the
widespread belief that there were supe-
rior and inferior races. Colonialism,
involving the conquest, exploration and
slaughter of millions of people in the
Americas, Africa and parts of Asia was
rationalized by the belief in the inferior-
ity of the alleged races inhabiting those
areas [COCKER 1998]. The rejection of
the race concept by most anthropologists
beginning most recently in the 1960s,
was based on the genetic evidence re-
viewed earlier. Conformity to political
correctness was not the cause of these
changes; rather awareness of the uses of
race in colonialism, slavery, segregation,
and in the holocaust stimulated re-
examination of the race concept using
the new genetic data that was accumu-
lated throughout the 20th century. The
presence of new genetic data does not
guarantee that the data will be given
careful consideration. This consideration
came about as a new generation of an-
thropologists with new biographical
experiences entered the discipline and
examined the new data that developed
during the century. Those who charac-
terize these developments as political
correctness are using simplistic reduc-
tionism, and a naive conception of sci-
ence in an ivory tower. Scientists must
struggle with and develop new data in
the context of biography and history.
Summary
The concept of biological race has de-
clined significantly in frequency of use
in physical anthropology in the United
States during the 20th century. We pres-
ent three kinds of evidence of this rejec-
tion of what was a core concept: (1) The
frequency of articles using the race
concept in the AJPA declined from
60 percent in 1918 to 4 percent in 2001
(r = -.89, p = .01). (2) Content analysis
of university level textbooks of intro-
ductory physical anthropology for 1980-
99 found only one textbook which sup-
ported the race concept. (3) A series of
mailed questionnaires to members of the
American Anthropological Association
found that while 37 percent of respond-
ing physical anthropologists rejected the
race concept in 1978, this rose to 69
percent in 1999.
Explaining this conceptual revolution
requires consideration of three kinds of
changes. First, new theory and clinal
data, second, the context of history (see
WEISS [2003]), and third, new biographi-
cal experiences of anthropologists that
connect the other two kinds of change.
The new theory developed in two
phases. In the first decades of the 20th
century F. BOAS [1911] and his students
develop the theory of culture, explaining
why societies differ and at the same time
rejecting racial determinism, and racial
hierarchy. Beginning in the early 1950s
S. WASHBURN [1951] rejects racial ty-
pology and advocates the study of
population processes, bringing the mod-
ern evolutionary synthesis into physical
anthropology. The new data consists of
the many detailed studies, early in the
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century, of the culture of various human
societies demonstrating how change
occurs, and the fact that people of ap-
parently similar race have many differ-
ent cultures and that environment may
alter biology (BOAS 1912). After mid-
century, F. LIVINGSTONE’S [1958] study
of sickle cell gene frequencies provided
a clinal geographic (gradations) alterna-
tive to discrete and homogenous races,
and C.L. BRACE [1964] persuasively
held that the study of each clinal distri-
bution provides a useful approach to the
study of human variation. R. LEWONTIN
[1972] utilized genetic data that demon-
strated that most human variation ex-
isted within populations (races), and
very little between them.
These and other studies provided the
basis for challenging the race concept.
But change would be accelerated by
historical developments that helped
overcome the power of thinking in terms
of race and racism. The Great Depres-
sion, beginning in 1929, provided per-
suasive evidence that poverty was not
controlled by genetic heredity, despite
the continued eugenic orientation of
scientists. More influential was the
knowledge of the use of race to justify
extermination of Jews, Gypsies, and
Poles in World War II [FREDRICKSON
2002]. There is a tendency for some to
dismiss the decline of race as the result
of political correctness. That position
allows those who favor the race concept
to continue to do so. In fact, the fall of
race is due the development of solid
empirical evidence, new theoretical
approaches, and the sensitizing assis-
tance of historical events.
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Streszczenie
Częstość posługiwania się pojęciem rasy biologicznej w Stanach Zjednoczonych syste-
matycznie malała w ciągu XX wieku. W pracy przedstawiamy trzy rodzaje dowodów na
wzrastającą tendencję do odrzucania tego fundamentalnego pojęcia: (1) Udział artykułów
w oficjalnym czasopiśmie Amerykańskiego Towarzystwa Antropologów Fizycznych
(AAPA) – American Journal of Physical Anthropology, w których wykorzystywano pojęcie
rasy, spadł z 60 % w 1918 r. do 4 % w roku 2001 (Rys. 1, Tab. 1) (r = -0,89; p = 0,01).
(2) Analiza zawartości podręczników akademickich do kursów antropologii fizycznej, z lat
1980–99, wykazała, że tylko w jednym z nich uznano istnienie ras. (3) Kolejne kwestiona-
riusze przesłane pocztą do członków American Anthropological Association pozwoliły na
wyciągnięcie wniosku, że odsetek antropologów fizycznych odrzucających pojęcie rasy
wzrósł z 37 % w 1978 r. do 69% w 1999 roku (patrz też Tab. 2).
Aby wyjaśnić tę rewolucję pojęciową należy rozważyć trzy kategorie przyczyn: po pierw-
sze nowa teoria i rozwój koncepcji zmienności klinalnej, po drugie kontekst historyczny
(patrz WEISS [2003]) i, po trzecie, nowe doświadczenia osobiste antropologów, które stały
się pomostem łączącym przyczyny biologiczne z historycznymi.
Nowe podejście do problemu zróżnicowania człowieka rozwijało się w dwóch fazach.
W pierwszej dekadzie XX w. F. BOAS [1911] i jego uczniowie rozwijali teorię kultury, wy-
jaśniając przyczyny różnic między społecznościami i odrzucając determinizm rasowy i po-
glądy o hierarchii ras. We wczesnych latach 50. S. WASHBURN [1951] odrzucił typologię
rasową i stał się rzecznikiem badań procesów populacyjnych, wprowadzając postulaty nowej
syntezy ewolucyjnej do antropologii fizycznej. Nowe dane pochodzące z licznych badań
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przeprowadzonych w początkach XX wieku na różnych społeczeństwach reprezentujących
rozmaite kultury pokazały zachodzące w nich zmiany, ujawniły również, że ludzie tej samej
,,rasy” tworzą wiele odmiennych kultur, a środowisko ma wpływ na biologię badanych grup
ludzkich [BOAS 1912]. W drugiej połowie wieku F. LIVINGSTONE [1958] badając częstości
występowania genu sierpowatości krwinek wykazał, że zmiany tej częstości mają charakter
gradientów geograficznych (klin), a nie nieciągłych rasowych skupień. C.L. BRACE [1964]
przekonywał, że badanie klinalnej zmienności poszczególnych cech jest przydatnym i właś-
ciwym podejściem do opisu zmienności człowieka. R. LEWONTIN [1972] wykorzystał dane
genetyczne by wykazać, że większość zmienności genetycznej człowieka realizuje się we-
wnątrz populacji (ras), a tylko jej cząstka między nimi.
Wszystkie te badania dały podstawę do zakwestionowania pojęcia rasy. Zmiany te zostały
przyspieszone przez wydarzenia historyczne, które ułatwiły pokonanie potęgi myślenia
w kategoriach ras i rasizmu. Wielki Kryzys, zapoczątkowany w 1929 r. wyraźnie pokazywał,
że ubóstwo nie jest kontrolowane przez geny, wbrew przekonaniom zwolenników eugeniki.
Jeszcze większy wpływ miało ujawnienie wykorzystania koncepcji rasowych do uza-
sadniania eksterminacji Żydów, Romów czy Polaków podczas II Wojny Światowej
[FREDRICKSON 2002]. Istnieje tendencja do przypisywania spadku popularności ras wymo-
gom politycznej poprawności. Taki pogląd pozwala zwolennikom koncepcji rasowych pozo-
stać przy swoim. W rzeczywistości upadek pojęcia rasy jest wynikiem nagromadzenia rze-
telnych danych empirycznych, rozwoju wiedzy teoretycznej i syntetyzującego działania
faktów historycznych.
